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The Story of One Ukrainian and His Long Journey to Justice
In May 2025, the Tel Aviv District Administrative Court issued a ruling that vividly demonstrates how government agencies can transform a lawful procedure into genuine bureaucratic torture. Artem’s case reveals not only problems with interpreting the concept of “religious conversion” in the context of the Law of Return, but also egregious violations of the principle of good faith by government agencies.
Back in 2018, Artem applied for repatriation status for himself, his wife, and children. The basis was that he was born to a Jewish mother and Jewish grandparents on his mother’s side. The Population and Immigration Authority did not dispute the fact of the applicant’s Jewish origin, but denied him status, citing that he “belongs to another religion.”
The roots of this claim lay in the fact that Artem was baptized as an infant at the insistence of his Christian father, and when filling out the application form in 2018, he indicated “Christian” in the “religion” field and “Jewish” in the “nationality” field. Additionally, he stated that he attends church once a year and celebrates major Christian holidays. However, even then Artem emphasized that the baptism occurred against his will in infancy, that he had actually lived his entire life as a Jew, and that his mother and Jewish grandmother never attended church and celebrated Jewish holidays.
The initial 2018 decision was laconic to the point of indecency: “Your request is denied because you were born to a Jewish mother but belong to another religion.” No justification, no reasoning—just a bare refusal. But this was only the beginning of a long journey through bureaucratic thickets.
Infant Baptism Against an Adult’s Will
The key issue in the case was the interpretation of the concepts “belonging to another religion” and “conversion by one’s own will,” enshrined in Articles 4a and 4b of the Law of Return. Israeli law, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in the famous Zavidovsky case, developed a practical criterion for determining who is considered “belonging to another religion.”
Tel Aviv District Court Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen thoroughly analyzed the criterion developed by the Supreme Court in her ruling. According to the Zavidovsky precedent, for a Jew to be considered as having converted to another religion, they must take radical steps—enter into the very essence of another religion. The definition of “apostate” requires identification with another religion and corresponding behavior. The examination is conducted based on a combination of factors: behavior, intention, consciousness, declaration, and willingness to enter the depths of another religion and accept its symbols.
In Artem’s case, the situation was fundamentally different from classic cases of religious conversion. He never claimed to live as a Christian or consciously accept Christianity as an adult. On the contrary, from the very beginning, he maintained that he was baptized in infancy on the initiative of his Christian father, but had actually always lived as a Jew. Moreover, he presented documentary evidence of his active participation in Jewish community life in Zaporizhzhia since 2006 and participation in charitable trips of the Jewish community of Kyiv from 2008 to 2023.
The court emphasized that the exception allowing denial of repatriation rights to someone born Jewish due to belonging to another religion applies only in extreme cases where a person “chooses the path of another religion.” It is extremely difficult to argue that a person who was baptized as an infant, even if his father celebrated Christian holidays alongside his mother who celebrated Jewish holidays during childhood, falls under the definition of “belonging to another religion” or that one can deny him repatriation rights as having converted by his own will.
The Bureaucratic Merry-Go-Round: How the Agency Gave the Applicant the Runaround
The Interior Ministry’s behavior in this case is a clear example of how the system can abuse procedural possibilities to exhaust a person and avoid making substantial decisions.
In June 2023, Artem filed his first administrative petition (with the help of attorney Reuven Lipkin) to the Jerusalem court. However, instead of preparing a response on the merits of the case, the Interior Ministry filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as filed late, simultaneously declaring readiness to consider a new application from the applicant. The Authority claimed that time is of substantial importance for decisions of this kind, so it’s necessary to consider circumstances current to 2023, not to the time the original decision was made.
The court agreed with this logic, and in November 2023, the first appeal was dismissed with the condition that the Israeli Interior Ministry would consider a new application as quickly as possible and provide Artem with necessary assistance if difficulties arose. It seemed like a reasonable decision opening the path to fair consideration of the case.
However, the Interior Ministry perceived this as a signal to begin a new series of bureaucratic maneuvers. Despite solemn assurances of readiness to quickly consider the new application, months passed without a decision. Artem underwent two additional interviews in his country of permanent residence, where he was frankly told that the decision would not change and that it was unclear why the case was reopened at all since the facts remained the same.
Only after filing a motion for contempt of court in the framework of the first case did the Interior Ministry finally announce a decision—to grant Artem and his family temporary A/5 status for one year to “verify his actual religious affiliation.” No written justifications were provided, and requests from lawyers for a reasoned decision received a laconic response: “This is the decision. A/5 for a year, after which a decision will be made. In many cases, a decision is made to grant A/5 with subsequent adoption of a new decision after a year.”
When a new administrative petition was filed in November 2024 to the Tel Aviv District Court, the Authority again tried to avoid considering the case on its merits, claiming a “new decision” and demanding that Artem withdraw the petition and again run through internal corridors of power. However, Judge Agmon-Gonen saw this not as a new decision, but as an attempt to retroactively justify a previously made unjustified decision.
When Honesty Becomes a Legal Requirement
An important part of Judge Agmon-Gonen’s decision is the analysis of applying the principle of good faith in administrative law and its systematic violation by the Israeli Interior Ministry. The judge dwelt in detail on the fact that adopting a new decision by an administrative body must be based on substantial grounds, with explanation of the need to adopt a new decision and whether the new decision was made after considering new or different circumstances.
New decisions must be based primarily on weighty business considerations, made after thorough study of circumstances and while maintaining balance between private interest and public interest. This is especially important, the judge noted, when a new decision changes a previous decision, but also in a case like the one under consideration, when the authority was given an opportunity to reconsider the application within the framework of rejecting the previous appeal.
The judge provided an extensive quote from the famous “Conterm” precedent, emphasizing the inequality of power between a government agency and a citizen: “Man and authority are not equal in rights, not equal in strength, and not equal in status. They are also not friends to each other. Authority holds great power, great might, and great wealth, so much so that an individual—whatever their strength, might, and wealth—cannot compare to it or be likened to it.”
In the context of Artem’s case, violation of the good faith principle manifested in several aspects. First, despite assurances of readiness to consider “new” circumstances of the case, the Israeli Interior Ministry actually conducted no new assessment of the situation. Second, decisions were made only under pressure from judicial procedures, not within the framework of normal administrative process. Third, the agency systematically evaded providing reasoned decisions, limiting itself to formal responses.
The judge was particularly outraged by the fact that this was the second time the Authority requested dismissal of the applicant’s appeal and return of the case for agency consideration. Given the Interior Ministry’s behavior the first time, the court deemed it unacceptable to allow this again. The judge noted that even during the court hearing, the Interior Ministry could not indicate any criterion or content of future verification supposedly planned for another year.
The court emphasized the unreasonableness of forcing the applicant to return to the Interior Ministry again and go through the same torturous path he went through after the first appeal, where the Interior Ministry requested exactly the same thing. This case demonstrates how difficult it sometimes is to defeat the bureaucratic machine that skillfully and ruthlessly plays administrative football with a person.
The judge also drew attention to the fundamental difference between situations requiring gradual verification (for example, when considering status applications based on family relationships with Israeli citizens) and cases of granting status under the Law of Return to a Jew who does not belong to another religion and has not changed their religion. If in the first case there is logic in observation and repeated verification of relationships, in the second case the logic of the law is extremely simple: a Jew according to the Law of Return is not obligated to prove their Jewishness every year in the future or convince that they live according to religious law.
Conclusion
The decision in Artem’s case is an important victory not only for the specific applicant but for all who face arbitrary actions by government agencies. The court gave a clear assessment of the Israeli Interior Ministry’s dishonest behavior.
The case showed that baptism in infancy cannot serve as grounds for denial of repatriation if a person actually lived their entire life as a Jew and actively participated in Jewish community life. The court confirmed that the exception to repatriation rights for those “belonging to another religion” applies only in extreme cases of conscious choice by an adult of a different religious path.
No less important was the judicial condemnation of bureaucratic tricks through which government agencies try to evade making decisions on the substance of cases. The principle of good faith in administrative law is not an abstract concept but a concrete requirement for honest and fair treatment of citizens. When civil servants forget this, courts must remind them of their obligations.
Artem’s story shows that even in the most complex bureaucratic labyrinths, justice can prevail—if there is patience, persistence, and competent legal protection. The court ordered the Interior Ministry to issue Artem and his family repatriation visas and imposed costs of 15,000 shekels on the Interior Ministry.
Case Number: 2308-11-24
Read also:
Religious Conversion and Immigration: Spiritual Quest or Bureaucratic Maneuver?
