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A woman born Jewish, raised from age six by her Muslim grandmother in Uzbekistan after her mother’s departure to Israel, fought a long battle for the right to immigrate—a right denied to her due to declarations of Islamic faith. Despite numerous rejections from the Interior Ministry and previous court instances, the District Court ultimately ruled that Shahzoda’s formal statements were insufficient proof of a conscious religious conversion.
The court held that substantial evidence of deliberate and voluntary renunciation of Judaism is required to restrict immigration rights, particularly when dealing with individuals raised in mixed families. The decision reflects positive changes in judicial practice following the 2017 reform, when such cases were transferred from Supreme Court jurisdiction to District Courts, which now apply a more flexible and individualized approach.
Introduction
Questions of religious identity in Israel are not merely personal matters. In a country where religion is deeply intertwined with the legal system and politics, determining a person’s religious affiliation can have serious legal consequences. This is particularly relevant when foreigners seek to obtain citizenship under the Law of Return. Such a situation became the subject of litigation in the case of Shahzoda v. Israel Ministry of Interior, where the court had to resolve a complex dilemma: did a woman born into a Jewish family actually convert to Islam and then return to Judaism, or were her declarations of Islamic faith merely formalities?
Case Background
Shahzoda (name changed) was born in Uzbekistan in 2000 to a Jewish mother and Muslim father. In 2006, when the girl was six years old, her mother moved to Israel with her new husband, while young Shahzoda and her younger brother (then four years old) remained in Uzbekistan under the care of their paternal grandmother.
Shahzoda’s mother obtained Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return as a Jew and married a Jewish man. She had two more children from this marriage in Israel. Notably, Shahzoda’s younger brother later also came to Israel, joined his half-siblings, and obtained Israeli citizenship.
In 2015, Shahzoda and her brother visited Israel. The brother remained in the country, while Shahzoda returned to Uzbekistan. According to the Interior Ministry, during this visit she applied for status under the Law of Return but failed to appear for an interview at the “Nativ” consular offices and left Israel. Her application was not processed.
In 2017, while in Uzbekistan, Shahzoda married a Muslim citizen of Uzbekistan. In 2018, the couple had a son. The marriage was registered civilly, and their son, according to Jewish tradition, underwent circumcision on the eighth day after birth.
In 2019, Shahzoda arrived in Israel with her husband and son and approached the Interior Ministry. Since Shahzoda believed she was entitled to Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return, she was referred to Nativ. When completing the immigration application, Shahzoda indicated “Muslim” in the religion field.
In November 2019, Shahzoda underwent an interview at Nativ. The interview was conducted in Russian without legal counsel. During the interview, Shahzoda declared (in writing—in the form of a declaration that she claims was drafted for her by a Nativ representative) that she adhered to the Muslim faith, that she and her family observed Muslim holidays and followed Islamic traditions.
Literal translation of the declaration: “I, Shahzoda, born ****, declare that I filled out the status change application No. **** with my own hand and in the nationality section indicated that I am ***, and in the religion section indicated that I am Muslim. My husband Bobur (name changed), Uzbek by nationality and Muslim by faith, as well as our son Alikhan (name changed), is Muslim by faith. We all follow the Muslim faith and celebrate Muslim holidays: Navruz (spring festival), Kurban, Ramadan. My husband attends the mosque, but women do not. My husband and I observe and adhere to all the commandments and traditions of Islam, including weddings and engagements. I declare that I believe in the Muslim god Allah and respect this faith. This statement is complete and true, written by my hand, with complete faith and fully corresponds to reality.”
Shortly thereafter, Shahzoda and her family were denied immigration because she had converted to another faith and declared that she observed Muslim holidays and practiced Islam.
Shahzoda appealed this decision without legal counsel. She argued that the words in the explanatory note incorrectly conveyed the meaning of the conversation, that during the interview she only spoke about how she was raised but did not call herself Muslim. Shahzoda emphasized that she was and remains Jewish, that her mother was Jewish, and that she, Shahzoda, wished to follow her mother’s traditions.
The Interior Ministry rejected the appeal, maintaining the previously stated grounds for refusal—conversion to Islam.
After court proceedings, the case was returned to the agency for reconsideration.
Shahzoda submitted a new application and underwent another interview in Russian with an Interior Ministry representative. In this interview, she answered questions about her lifestyle and stated that in Uzbekistan she attended a Jewish kindergarten where they celebrated Jewish holidays. Regarding religious holidays, this time Shahzoda said she didn’t remember much, but they definitely celebrated March 8th at home and she was taken to a Jewish kindergarten where they celebrated Purim. When asked what she knew about Jewish holidays, she replied: “Rosh Hashanah is when the new sacred year begins, on Purim everyone dresses up, on Passover they don’t eat chametz, they eat matzo, on Lag BaOmer they light bonfires, and on Shavuot they bake sufganiyot.”
When asked why Shahzoda wrote in the form that she practiced Islam, the answer came: “I didn’t know what to write. My grandmother told me what to write.” When asked which grandmother helped her, she couldn’t say whether this grandmother was Muslim or not. Shahzoda explained that the Nativ employee handed her a piece of paper and practically dictated the text. Then he asked what holidays she celebrated, and when Shahzoda replied that she didn’t know, the employee became angry and said she was obligated to answer this question.
Soon the Interior Ministry again denied Shahzoda’s immigration request. In its decision, the agency explained that Shahzoda’s words contained many contradictions and inconsistencies that did not inspire confidence.
The subsequent appeal was also rejected. The decision noted that there were numerous contradictions between previous statements to “Nativ” and claims in the interview, which were interpreted as intentional and bad-faith changes in testimony.
The Interior Ministry explained that statements about being raised in a family without religious identity and about the grandmother helping Shahzoda fill out the immigration application contradicted her previous statements. The agency concluded that Shahzoda deliberately changed her story.
The second appeal to the administrative court was also rejected. The court agreed with the Interior Ministry’s position and found that the system justly applied the law’s provision regarding conscious religious conversion as grounds for immigration denial. The court noted that Shahzoda “chose to live and grow up in Uzbekistan, and also chose to marry there a person who is not Jewish.” The court also found no evidence in the case that Shahzoda had ever returned to Judaism.
Shahzoda and her family did not accept this decision and filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also rejected the appeal but indicated the applicants’ right to file a new application, within which Shahzoda could present additional evidence.
Shahzoda filed a new application with the Interior Ministry, attaching several documents:
- Photos of Purim and Bar Mitzvah celebrations held at Shahzoda’s kindergarten in Uzbekistan;
- Document confirming her son’s circumcision;
- Letter from an imam from the region where the family lived in Uzbekistan, confirming they did not conduct a wedding ceremony according to Muslim customs and that Shahzoda did not convert to Islam;
- Photos of the spouses at various events, including photos of them celebrating Jewish holidays in family circles;
- Letter from Shahzoda’s grandmother stating: “We are not believers, not religious, we have a secular lifestyle. We do not attend synagogues or mosques”;
- Letter from Shahzoda’s cousin (who is also her sister-in-law) stating: “He (Shahzoda’s husband) married my cousin, my uncle’s daughter. They fell in love and decided to marry in Uzbekistan. There was no religious wedding in Uzbekistan. They are secular people. They knew we were Jews…”
In early 2023, the couple underwent another interview. Shahzoda’s husband described their life in Uzbekistan as follows: “It was a secular lifestyle… We celebrated New Year, March 8th, Soviet Army Day… No one in our family goes to mosques or leads a Muslim lifestyle. We got married at the city registry office in Samarkand. We registered, they registered us, then we went to the hall and celebrated there.” Regarding his son’s circumcision, he said: “We did the circumcision on the eighth day, my wife’s mother insisted on it, we went to the hospital, and the procedure was performed there. We were there, my wife’s mother and I… We don’t follow Muslim customs or any other religion, but at my wife’s mother’s request we conducted this procedure. For me it doesn’t matter because I’m not religious. And all Muslims also do circumcision, but not necessarily on the 8th day.” About his lifestyle, he said: “I am with my wife’s family, my wife at home adheres to Jewish traditions, and I instill them, what the wife does and the children according to Jewish law, I don’t interfere. I have never been to any religious institution, but there was a case when I visited a hotel with my wife’s family.”
Shahzoda told the following: “At home we didn’t lead any religious life, I went to a Jewish kindergarten where they conducted Jewish holidays and celebrated Jewish holidays: Hanukkah, Purim, etc… My mother’s lifestyle is unknown to me… She doesn’t know and hasn’t seen any religious ceremonies at all—neither Jewish nor Muslim; I never saw my father or mother pray either as Muslims or as Jews, they didn’t celebrate holidays in Samarkand.”
When asked how her parents got married, Shahzoda replied: “At the Samarkand city registry office, they told me they did it at the city registry office.” She also noted that both her brothers were circumcised, “one in Samarkand, one in Israel, at eight days old, a doctor performed the procedure… In Samarkand during my brother’s circumcision I was small and don’t remember, and in Israel a rabbi did it for my brother.”
Regarding her relationship with her grandmother (mother’s mother), Shahzoda said she didn’t remember her maternal grandmother, and communicated periodically with her paternal grandmother.
When asked why Shahzoda indicated Islam as her religion in the form, she explained that she did so on her grandmother’s advice. Shahzoda couldn’t explain why the grandmother, who according to her own words led a secular lifestyle, advised indicating Islam. Shahzoda also explained that she filled out the “Nativ” form at home following her grandmother’s instructions, and the declaration was dictated to her by a Nativ employee. “He told me to write what holidays we celebrate, and I said I don’t know what holidays, and then he named the holidays Kurban and Ramadan to me, and I said ‘yes’ to everything he said.”
Shahzoda categorically denied ever converting to Islam and further stated that in Israel she and her family members live here as Jews, observe Jewish holidays, celebrate Rosh Hashanah, Hanukkah, Purim.
In August 2023, the system again denied the family immigration. The decision noted that from the latest interview with Shahzoda it was clear that she speaks and understands Russian, and therefore the claim about language difficulties that allegedly led to errors when filling out the “Nativ” form or in the declaration could not be accepted. The agency again drew attention to contradictions in Shahzoda’s testimony and rejected her claims that she never changed her faith and currently leads a secular Jewish lifestyle. The Interior Ministry gave no weight to the imam’s letter, explaining that the certificate is issued by a religious figure at a specific mosque, but for any visitor from another city and religious figure who conducts marriage registrations, it is not binding or authoritative.
The Interior Ministry also gave no weight to the son’s circumcision. This is not a religious act but a medical procedure performed in a hospital without any religious significance, and therefore the date when it was performed and the child’s age do not matter. Moreover, as the applicant herself testified in the interview… circumcision is also practiced in Islam—this is how Interior Ministry officials motivated their decision.
Shahzoda did not stop there and once again appealed to the court.
Legal Framework
Shahzoda’s case was considered in the context of the Law of Return and corresponding regulations. The key issue concerned the interpretation of Section 4A(a) of this law, which defines who is entitled to citizenship under the Law of Return, and excludes from this list “persons who were Jews and voluntarily changed their faith.”
The court noted that an administrative decision about a person’s Jewishness and their right to citizenship under the Law of Return must be based on concrete evidence. Since the law does not specify particular types of evidence, “administrative evidence” must be applied—”evidence that a reasonable person—and reasonable authority—would rely on and consider as evidence having probative value and sufficient under the given circumstances.”
Judicial practice on this issue has established that the main evidence is usually the applicant’s own statement, and usually this statement is the only evidence that authorities rely on when determining an applicant’s Jewishness under the Law of Return. Such evidence clearly falls into the category of evidence that a reasonable person or authority would rely on under the given circumstances.
Court Analysis: What Does “Change Faith” Mean?
The court addressed the question of what criteria should be applied to determine when a person born a halakhic Jew converts to another faith. Judicial practice has considered three possible criteria: adopting another religion, renouncing Judaism, or a combined approach.
The court noted that for a Jew to be considered as having “changed faith,” conscious and voluntary active action is necessary. The person must perform a conscious act clearly indicating their intention to renounce Judaism and adopt another religion. This is not about formality but a deeply conscious personal decision that must be confirmed by real lifestyle.
The court explained: when dealing with people raised in mixed families, especially if they were brought up by relatives practicing another faith, special caution must be exercised and conclusions about conscious “faith change” should not be rushed. The court emphasized that one cannot automatically rely on a lifestyle that a child simply followed while living in a family as evidence of their conscious choice to renounce Judaism.
Analyzing the available evidence, the court concluded that even assuming that at the time of completing the declaration Shahzoda actually followed Muslim customs, it does not follow that she consciously “changed faith” in the context of the Law of Return.
The court noted that Shahzoda presented convincing evidence of her lack of religious Muslim upbringing. She grew up in a secular family in Uzbekistan, where, as is known, after the USSR’s collapse, religious practice was significantly weakened even among nominally religious families. The court found credible her claim that she lived mainly a secular life, not strictly connected to either Islam or Judaism.
Regarding the statements signed by Shahzoda at the “Nativ” office, the court found reasonable her explanations that she simply followed officials’ instructions and did not fully understand the consequences of her statements.
The court disagreed with the Interior Ministry’s argument that Shahzoda’s marriage to a Muslim evidenced her conversion to Islam. It was noted that the marriage was contracted through civil procedure, without religious ceremony, and that such interfaith marriages are common among secular people.
The court also did not attach decisive significance to the fact of Shahzoda’s upbringing by a Muslim grandmother. The judges recognized that under such circumstances it is difficult to speak of a “conscious choice” by a little girl to follow one religion or another—she simply lived in the environment available to her after her mother’s departure.
The court noted that the Interior Ministry, in denying Shahzoda’s right to immigration, placed too much significance on the mere fact of her signing a declaration of Islamic affiliation, but did not consider the totality of circumstances in the case.
Court Decision
The court overturned the Interior Ministry’s decision for lack of merit. The judge established that the case lacked sufficient evidence and grounds to apply the exclusionary provision to Shahzoda.
The court ordered the Interior Ministry to grant Shahzoda and her family the right to obtain new immigrant status under the Law of Return.
Conclusion
The case of Shahzoda v. Israel Ministry of Interior represents an important decision in the context of applying the Law of Return to people with complex religious backgrounds. The court took a balanced position, recognizing that formal declarations of religious affiliation do not always reflect a person’s actual beliefs, especially when dealing with people raised in mixed families or complex sociocultural conditions.
Following the court’s position in another case, this decision reflects qualitative changes in the District Court’s approach to such problems after the 2017 reform. When cases of this category were heard by the Supreme Court (before the reform), a more formal approach prevailed, where applicants’ statements and words about their religion were taken at face value, without deep analysis of the context in which these statements were made.
After the 2017 reform and transfer of this category of cases to District Court jurisdiction, there is a trend toward more thorough consideration of individual circumstances of each case. Judges have begun paying more attention to questions of voluntariness and consciousness when evaluating the fact of “faith change,” as well as cultural and social factors influencing a person’s religious self-identification.
Such an approach is more just and corresponds to the spirit of the Law of Return, which was created to facilitate Jewish immigration to Israel, not to create bureaucratic obstacles on this path. This is particularly relevant for Jews from the former USSR, where many lost connection with religious traditions due to Soviet atheism policy, and then found themselves in difficult socio-economic conditions that could influence their religious self-identification.
Case No. 13669-02-25
